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Though deliberation is a critical component of democratic decision-making, existing deliberative processes
do not scale to large groups of people. Motivated by this, we propose a model in which large-scale decision-
making takes place through a sequence of small group interactions. Our model considers a group of partic-
ipants, each having an opinion which together form a graph. We show that for median graphs, a class of
graphs including grids and trees, it is possible to use a small number of three-person interactions to tightly
approximate the wisdom of the crowd, defined here to be the generalized median of participant opinions,
even when agents are strategic. Interestingly, we also show that this sharply contrasts with small groups
of size two, for which we prove an impossibility result. Specifically, we show that it is impossible to use
sequences of two-person interactions satisfying natural axioms to find a tight approximation of the gener-
alized median, even when agents are non-strategic. Our results demonstrate the potential of small group
interactions for reaching global decision-making properties.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: participatory and deliberative democracy, decision-making at scale,
wisdom of the crowd, triadic consensus, small groups
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen an increase in the number of democratic innovations [Smith
2009] aimed at increasing the participation of the public in policy-making. While the
core argument of participatory democracy states that democracy is made more mean-
ingful when citizens are directly involved [Fung and Wright 2003; Macpherson 1977;
Pateman 1979], it has also been argued that participatory practices foster more en-
gaged citizens [Fung and Wright 2003] and can better harness the wisdom of the
crowds [Landemore and Elster 2012]. One class of these processes emphasizes delib-
eration as an essential component to democratic decision-making. Proponents argue
that deliberation grants legitimacy to the democratic process [Gutmann and Thomp-
son 2004], can produce outcomes superior to those resulting from mere voting [Fishkin
2011], and may be a means through which one can mediate conversations among polar-
ized participants [Menkel-Meadow 2011]. The latter is particularly desirable in light of
the increasing polarization that has been observed in politics and society at large [Mc-
Carty et al. 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1984].
A major challenge for increasing participation is the problem of effectively scaling up
to thousands or millions of people. Yet, while there have been many efforts at scaling
up voting to large numbers of proposals [Conitzer and Sandholm 2005; Lee et al. 2014;
Lu and Boutilier 2011; Service and Adams 2012], the problem of scaling up delibera-
tion has been largely untouched. One part of the problem is that humans face funda-
mental cognitive and psychological barriers that prevent effective communication in
large groups. For instance, it is known that humans can only hold a small number of
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concepts in their working memory [Miller 1956], that there are fundamental limits to
effective group sizes [Dunbar 1992], and that humans can become more disengaged
when in a large group [Latane´ et al. 1979].
Existing initiatives such as The Deliberative Poll [Fishkin et al. 2000] and the 21st
Century Town Hall Meeting [Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2002], while successful on
many counts, have typically operated at the scale of hundreds, or at most, thousands
of participants. Even for these events, a major component of these processes involve
further breaking down the gathered participants into small group discussions.
Motivated by this observation, this paper considers whether large-scale decision-
making can take place through a sequence of small group interactions. Essentially,
we take the view that the deliberative decision-making process can be, at its core, the
interaction of many separate but intertwined deliberations. The use of small groups
circumvents communication barriers, changing the problem of scalability from that of
increasing group size to that of decreasing the number of small group interactions nec-
essary. Thus, our use of small groups for scaling up deliberation can be thought of as
analogous to the use of pairwise comparisons for scaling up voting when the number of
proposals is very large [Lee et al. 2014]. From a practical perspective, scaling delibera-
tion via small groups would not have been feasible even 10 years ago. Today, however,
advances in communication and Internet-based technologies such as video conferenc-
ing have made it trivial for arbitrary small groups of individuals to deliberate with
one another, and moreover, to sequence these deliberations based on outcomes of prior
small groups.
In our model, participants each have an opinion which together form a graph. Partic-
ipants prefer opinions that are closer to their own. Our goal is to find the generalized
median using a sequence of small group interactions, where the generalized median
is defined as the point minimizing sum of distances to the initial opinions. Each small
group is required to come to a small group decision, which is modeled by us in two dis-
tinct ways. For our impossibility results, we assume that agents do not behave strate-
gically, and that the small group decision is therefore a (possibly stochastic) function of
the opinions of the small group members. We assume that this function satisfies nat-
ural axioms. For our positive results, we allow strategic agents. This means that the
small group decision is the result of the negotiation strategies chosen by the individu-
als in that group. Under this framework, our main findings uncover a sharp dichotomy
among small group processes:
— First, we obtain a surprising impossibility result for dyadic decision-making even for
non-strategic agents. We show that under natural axioms, no sequence of two-person
interactions can accurately estimate the generalized median. This holds even for the
simple case when opinions lie on a line.
— In contrast, for triadic decision-making, we obtain a strong positive result even for
strategic agents. We prove that when the small group decision is decided through
majority rule dynamics, a small number of three-person interactions (an average of
only O(log2n) triads per person) finds a tight approximation of the generalized me-
dian. This holds not only when agents have opinions from a line, but for every graph
for which every three individuals in the graph have a majority rule equilibrium (we
prove this is identical to a class of graphs known as median graphs). The mechanism
we give is shown to achieve our results under a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1 illustrates our mechanism for the simple case where the opinions of the
voters lie on a line. Given a triad, our mechanism for this case reduces to each member
voting among the other two. This results in the median participant winning two votes,
and getting increased weight in later rounds. Details are described in later sections.
To show our positive results for triadic decision-making, we first show that our mech-
Fig. 1: For the special case of triads on a line, our mechanism can be reduced to having each
individual vote between the other two participants. This results in the median participant re-
ceiving two votes.
anism induces a behavior in which every triad reports its true generalized median;
hence our game-theoretic result is also valid if we postulate an small group decision
dynamic where triads agree on their generalized median.
These findings, put together, illustrate the importance of triads for small group
decision-making. The fact that only an extremely small number of triads is required
is a positive indicator of the feasibility of achieving deliberative decision-making at
scale. The fact that it is not achievable with dyadic interactions is surprisingly ini-
tially, but makes intuitive sense after the fact: when participating in a two-person
interaction, it is impossible to protect against an extreme outlier. If two individuals
are to be treated fairly, an arbitrarily unreasonable individual could greatly affect the
decision made. On the other hand, three-person interactions can essentially ignore
single outliers through simple processes such as majority rule.
Before moving on, we also want to put our results in the broader context of deliber-
ative democracy. Our model is focused on large-scale decision-making through small
group interactions, which we believe will play an important part of deliberative sys-
tems due to the benefits of back-and-forth dialogue. However, our results do not ac-
count for an information-based evolution of beliefs. Our main theorem (Theorem 6.3)
essentially states that, if groups of three can find their generalized median, then we
can find the global generalized median of initial opinions by composing a small num-
ber of three-person decisions. If beliefs change, then one would really want to find the
generalized median of new opinions after sufficient information exchange has occured.
From a political theorist’s perspective, deliberative democracy must involve a reasoned
exchange of information, and not just negotiation [Gutmann and Thompson 2004].
Therefore, a critical step for the future is to consider models of decision-making where
information is taken into account. It is also important to note that, while deliberation
was traditionally viewed as an exchange of arguments among individuals, theorists
have recently expanded that definition to encompass richer dynamics. In this view, po-
litical debates, news media, or dialogue over a social network (that has the potential
to influence decision-making outcomes) can also be viewed as a part of a deliberative
system. We believe that studying models for decision-making that incorporate richer,
deliberative dynamics is an important question for the future.
2. MODEL
2.1. Participant opinions and median graphs
In our model, n participants have opinions V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} which are nodes of a
graph G = (V,E). This graph is a representation of the opinion space. Each participant
prefers opinions that are closer to his own, where the distance d(x, y) is defined as
the shortest path distance between opinions x and y in the graph. The participants
participate in an algorithmically defined sequence of small group interactions, each
of which results in a small group decision. When a stopping criterion is reached, a
function maps the sequence of small group decisions to a final consensus decision.
A common example of an opinion space is to consider opinions on a line representing
the liberal-conservative axis. This line could, for example, lie in a high-dimensional
Fig. 2: The red circle is the generalized median of the three orange squares.
space (e.g. specific budget or policy proposals), so long as participants preferences are
determined by distances on the line (how conservative or liberal the proposals are).
For our positive results on scaling decision-making using a sequence of triads (The-
orem 6.3), our results are only true for graphs where every three individuals in the
graph have a majority rule equilibrium (also known as Condorcet winner), i.e. there
exists an opinion that would receive two out of the three votes against any other opin-
ion. This turns out to coincide to a class of graphs called median graphs (we prove
this in Theorem 6.2). Median graphs include several common classes of graphs such as
trees, grids, and squaregraphs. As a toy example, if one were deciding on ice-cream fla-
vors, one might represent the opinions as a two-dimensional grid graph where the two
axes correspond to discrete levels of sweetness and fattiness. If people’s preferences
for ice-cream flavors are roughly determined independently by sweetness and fatti-
ness (or any finite number of dimensions), then this could be represented by a median
graph. However, there are many graphs which are not median graphs. For instance,
any graph with a triangle cannot be a median graph.
2.2. The generalized median as the wisdom of the crowd
Our objective is to find the wisdom of the crowd, here defined to be the generalized
median x∗, the opinion which minimizes the sum of distances to all of the participant
opinions (see Figure 2). Formally, x∗ = arg minx∈V D(x), where D(x) =
∑n
i=1 d(x, xi).
The decision-making process achieves a (1 + )-approximation of the generalized me-
dian if the final consensus decision is a point xˆ for which D(xˆ) ≤ (1 + )D(x∗), i.e. xˆ
almost minimizes the sum of distances. We seek sequences of small group interactions
for which → 0 as the number of participants increases (n→∞).
The concept of the wisdom of the crowd [Surowiecki 2005] originated in 1907 from
Sir Francis Galton’s paper [Galton 1907b] describing a competition at a carnival in
which participants could guess the weight of an ox. As people made their estimates,
Galton recorded them and observed that the median, which he called the Vox Populi
or voice of the people, was remarkably close to the correct answer. Based on this, he
hypothesized that an appropriate aggregation of a crowd’s preferences can produce an
extremely accurate estimate.
Much of the following theoretical work on the wisdom of the crowd has chosen to
study the mean rather than the median [Golub and Jackson 2010]. We follow Gal-
ton, who stated that he preferred the median over the mean due to its robustness
to outliers and the fact that the median is the Condorcet winner, the opinion which
is preferred by at least half of the participants to any other opinion [Galton 1907a;
Hooker 1907]. Since we consider opinions that lie in high-dimensional metric spaces,
we take the wisdom of the crowd to be the generalized median, which is also robust
to outliers [Lopuhaa¨ and Rousseeuw 1991] and closely related to the Condorcet win-
ner [Bandelt and Barthelemy 1984; Saban and Stier-Moses 2012]. We also note that
recent experimental studies also support the position that the median is more accurate
than the mean [Lorenz et al. 2011].
2.3. Large-scale decision-making via small groups
We will use an LDSG process to refer to a large-scale decision-making process con-
ducted through small group interactions. In our process, each participant starts with
k tokens, which can be thought of as k votes. Unless otherwise specified, we will as-
sume k = 1. A small group of participants is chosen by a (possibly stochastic) small
group selection function f to deliberate with one another, with the requirement that
the members must come to a small group decision on a single participant to be their
representative. This participant, who does not need to be one of the group members, is
then given one token from each of the group members. We use St to represent the t-th
small group and gt to represent the small group decision that they come to. Another
small group is chosen (again, by the function f ), which can be dependent on the past
history of small group decisions. This process is repeated until one participant has all
the tokens. This participant’s opinion is returned as the final consensus decision xˆ.
Formally,
Definition 2.1. An LDSG process L is a triple L = (V, f, g), where V is the set of
participants V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, f is the small group selection function which maps
the sequence of past small groups and small group decisions to the next small group,
and {gt, t ≥ 1} are the small group decisions chosen by the t-th small group. Let St
denote the small group chosen to interact in the t-th round and let yti denote the par-
ticipant holding the i-th token after the t-th round. Let T be the round at which the
process ends, and xˆ denote the final consensus decision made. Then,
y0i = xi,
yt+1i =
{
gt+1 if yti ∈ St+1
yti otherwise
,
St+1 = f(〈S1, g1, S2, g2, . . . , St, gt〉),
T = min{t | yt1 = yt2 = · · · = ytn},
xˆ = yT1
2.4. Small group decision-making
In our model’s full generality, the small group decision gt can be modeled in two distinct
ways. For non-strategic agents, we represent it by a small group decision function
g : S → PV , which maps any small group S ⊆ V to a probability distribution PV over
the set of opinions V , i.e. gt = g(St). For strategic agents, the decision of a small group
is taken to be the output of a mechanism that the small group participates in. This
output is a function of the strategic decisions that the small group participants choose
to make. Since participants can base their strategies on the entire history of the LDSG
game up to that time, gt is not necessarily a function solely of St.
For our dyadic impossibility results, we will consider non-strategic agents and show
that no function g(St) exists which simultaneously satisfies natural axioms and also
results in tight approximation of the generalized median. In our result on triadic in-
teractions, we will consider small groups which make their decision through a simple
majority rule process. In the non-strategic case, g(St) is assumed to be the majority
rule equilibrium for that small group (described further in Section 6). In the strate-
gic case, we will give a formal representation of the entire sequence of small group
majority rule processes as an infinite-horizon extensive form game (Section 7).
3. OUTLINE
After describing further related work (Section 4), the remainder of this paper will be
structured as follows. Section 5 will present our impossibility result on dyadic inter-
actions. Section 6 contains our results on scaling deliberative decision-making with
three-person non-strategic interactions. This section will formally define the majority
rule process and equilibrium that motivates our model of the small group decision
function g(St). It will then use this to show that O(n log2 n) triads suffice to find a tight
approximation of the generalized median for a large class of graphs. Section 7 expands
on the prior section by considering the case when agents are strategic and show that
we can achieve the same results under a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally,
we conclude in Section 8 with a brief discussion of future directions.
4. RELATED WORK
The problem of scaling up decision-making is a well-studied problem in the context of
voting and preference elicitation. In this context, one is typically trying to approximate
or calculate the output of a social choice function while only eliciting small amounts
of information from voters (e.g. through pairwise comparisons) [Conitzer and Sand-
holm 2005; Lee et al. 2014; Lu and Boutilier 2011; Service and Adams 2012]. Our
paper can be viewed as an attempt to create a thread of research mirroring prefer-
ence elicitation, but for deliberative processes. Thus far, computational social choice
has primarily viewed decision-making and preference elicitation from the perspective
of efficiency, accuracy, and strategic issues. We propose that deliberation is a valuable
new dimension to consider in social choice and provide a small step in this direction.
We discuss this direction more in the concluding section.
Median graphs have been studied before in the context of voting. For instance, it is
known that for median graphs, the Condorcet winner is strongly related to the gener-
alized median [Bandelt and Barthelemy 1984; Saban and Stier-Moses 2012; Wendell
and McKelvey 1981]. Nehring and Puppe [Nehring and Puppe 2007] show that any
single-peaked domain which admits a non-dictatorial and neutral strategy-proof so-
cial choice function is a median space. Clearwater et. al. also showed that any set of
voters and alternatives on a median graph will have a Condorcet winner (their full
result is stronger than this) [Clearwater et al. 2015].
A similar high-level triadic decision-making process was proposed in a prior paper
by the authors [Goel and Lee 2012] and analyzed for the restricted case (described
in Figure 1) of opinions on a line. In this paper, we consider richer small group deci-
sion dynamics such as majority rule. We also consider spaces more complex than the
line and provide a general framework for analyzing deliberative decision-making that
enables us to prove an impossibility result for dyads.
To our knowledge, we are not aware of other literature on algorithmic or mathemat-
ical models for scaling deliberation. However, the problem of scaling deliberation has
been discussed in the political science community. Deliberation was initially conceptu-
alized as an exchange of arguments among a small group of rational individuals. Re-
cent developments acknowledge that deliberation should be thought of in richer ways,
including as an activity that takes place at the system level, among groups. [Parkinson
and Mansbridge 2012]. In other words, it has recently become possible to think of de-
liberation as a task that can be broken down into various components and performed
at different social levels and by large numbers of individuals. There have also been sev-
eral practical initiatives for scaling deliberation such as Deliberative Polling [Fishkin
et al. 2000], in which a single representative sample of participants is brought together
to deliberate, and the 21st Century Town Hall Meeting [Lukensmeyer and Brigham
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Fig. 3: The green, brown, and white participants in the two separate graphs have the same
opinion structure since their positions relative to their convex hulls (the dotted blue lines) are
identical. In this example, a locally consistent small group decision function would have to assign
the same probability to the event in which the participants choose the yellow participant in
either graph.
2002], in which the entire set of participants are divided into tables of size 10 for a
single round of deliberation followed by voting.
The study of majority rule dynamics, which is an important part of deliberative
decision-making, has also been a long-studied problem. A particular relevant experi-
mental result analyzed the majority rule dynamic in groups of five and showed that
the solution concept that performed best (out of 16 considered) was the majority rule
equilibrium [Fiorina and Plott 1978]. Our work is a natural next step of this observa-
tion applied to the goal of scaling deliberative decision-making. Namely, given exper-
imental evidence for the ability of small groups to come to consensus on the majority
rule equilibrium, how can we use these small groups to make good decisions for larger
groups?
Finally, we also note that our work has strong connections to opinion formation dy-
namics. Deliberative decision-making processes are essentially opinion formation dy-
namics for which one can algorithmically choose the sequence of interactions, rather
than having them decided by a given social network [DeGroot 1974] or a nature-
induced flocking process [Tsitsiklis 1984]. Most models of opinion formation use a
weighted averaging dynamic and consider the mean rather than the median. We note
that our main result on the dichotomy between triadic and dyadic decision-making
can be adapted for opinion formation dynamics. Namely, for any opinion formation dy-
namic to have a chance at approximating the median, individuals should talk to at
least two people before they update their opinions. Otherwise, the group consensus
will be too easily influenced by extreme opinions.
5. DYADS CANNOT TIGHTLY APPROXIMATE THE GENERALIZED MEDIAN
We now prove our impossibility result for dyadic decision-making. This result holds
for all small group decision functions g satisfying an axiom we call local consistency.
Informally, local consistency captures the fact that the decision made among a set of
non-strategic participants should only depend on the relationship structure of the par-
ticipant opinions to each other. In other words, if one set of opinions is a “translation”
of a second set of opinions, then the small group decision of the second set should be the
same “translation” of the small group decision of the first set. This is depicted visually
in Figure 3.
More formally, we use the notion of convex sets and convex hulls to capture the
opinion structure of a set of participants. A convex set is any set such that for any x, y
in the set, all shortest paths between x and y also lie in the set. The convex hull of S,
denoted as CS , is the smallest convex set containing S.
Definition 5.1. S and S′ are said to have the same opinion structure under ψ if
ψ : CS → CS′ is an isometry (distance-preserving map) between CS and CS′ such that
S′ = ψ(S).
Definition 5.2. The small group decision function g is said to be locally consistent
if, (1) for any S, g(S) ∈ CS , and (2) for any S and S′ with the same opinion structure
under ψ, g(S′) = ψ(g(S)).
For equally influential participants, this definition encompasses well-known mathe-
matical models in opinion formation such as DeGroot and flocking [DeGroot 1974;
Tsitsiklis 1984]. We also note that, while we only focus on equally influential partici-
pants in this paper due to space contraints, our impossibility results also generalize to
participants with varying degrees of influence (with an appropriate generalization of
the model to account for an influence parameter).
THEOREM 5.3. Consider the LDSG process L = (V, f, g) where f is defined in any
way such that |St| = 2 for all t, and gt = g(St) where g(·) is any locally consistent
function. Then there exists a configuration of the participant opinions on a line graph
such that the final consensus decision xˆ satisfies
E[D(xˆ)] ≥
(
9
8
− o(1)
)
D(x∗)
where x∗ is the generalized median.
PROOF. The proof is by constructing a counterexample (see Appendix D).
In other words, simple examples exist for which the error  is always lower bounded
by 1/8, regardless of how many participants are involved or how many small group
interactions take place. We pont out that a constant factor approximation is not satis-
fying since, in many scenarios, even the worst candidate is a constant factor approxi-
mation.
6. O(N LOG2N) TRIADS TIGHTLY APPROXIMATE THE GENERALIZED MEDIAN
In contrast to the impossibility result concerning dyadic decision-making, we find that
triadic decision-making under a simple majority rule process is able to find an ex-
tremely tight approximation of the generalized median while only requiring an aver-
age of O(log2 n) triads per participant.
The main step in the proof is to first assume that every triad decides on their (local)
generalized median. We show that if this is true, then we can find a tight approxima-
tion of the (global) generalized median. This assumption is justified by showing that
the generalized median is the equilibrium of the majority rule process for any small
group coming from the preference domain we are considering (median graphs). This
section will only consider non-strategic agents. Section 7 will extend this to the strate-
gic case.
6.1. Triadic decision-making
The small group selection function f we use for selecting small groups is a simple
randomized process. At each step, three tokens will be selected uniformly at random
with replacement. The participants holding these tokens form the group St at time t.
Our result (Theorem 6.3) in Section 6.2 does not depend on any specific small group
process, only on the assumption that every three-person interaction decides on the
generalized median. This section, however, will motivate the generalized median by
considering small groups which make their final decision through a specific process:
majority rule (described below, and depicted in Figure 4). We model the small group
decision function as the majority rule equilibrium and consider only those graphs for
which a majority rule equilibrium exists for every group of three. For such graphs, it
S E
Propose Vote
Majority rule (g)
(f)
Small group 
selection
a
c
d
b
Fig. 4: A block diagram of triadic decision-making with majority rule. The process starts (S)
with selecting a small group (“Small group selection”). After selecting a small group (a), the
small group participates in the majority rule process which starts with a “Propose” action. After
a proposal (c), all three participants “Vote” on the proposal. If there was no motion to end which
was accepted by two of the three participants, then another proposal is taken (d). This repeats
until a participant motions to end, and two of the three participants accept. If all tokens now
belong to a single participant, the overall process ends (E). Otherwise, another small group is
selected (b) and the new group of participants engage in the majority rule process. Extensive
form representations of each block are sketched in Figure 6.
turns out that the majority rule equilibrium coincides with the generalized median.
Thus, we have the following formalization.
Definition 6.1. Define triadic decision-making as an LDSG process L = (V, f, g)
where gt = g(St) = generalized-median(St). For round t + 1, let It+1 = {u, u′, u′′}
denote three tokens selected uniformly at random with replacement, i.e. u, u′, u′′ i.i.d.∼
Un, where Un denotes the uniform distribution over integers 1, 2, . . . , n. Then define f
such that, for all t,
St+1 = {ytu, ytu′ , ytu′′}
Majority rule is a classical process for making a decision in a group. Majority rule
occurs in rounds in which participants repeatedly suggest an alternate decision to
some status quo. If at least two of the three participants vote for the alternate, then
the status quo is replaced with the alternative. In practice, there are many variations
in the way majority rule is implemented. For concreteness, we consider the following
majority rule process for groups of three participants.
— (Initial) At the beginning, two participants are chosen uniformly at random. One is
chosen to be the current winner and the other is chosen to be the proposer,
— (Propose) At the start of each round, the proposer proposes an alternative winner,
— (Vote) All three participants then simultaneously vote for either the current winner
or the suggested alternative,
— (Update) The proposal which received the majority of the votes becomes the new
current winner. If the vote was unanimous, then the proposer remains the same.
Otherwise, the participant who lost the vote becomes the new proposer.
— (Repeat) Another round takes place starting from the Propose step,
— (Termination) During any round, the proposer can propose to end the process instead
of proposing an alternative. If he does, and if a majority votes to accept, then the
process ends. Otherwise, the proposer is updated according to the same rule in the
Update step and another round takes place starting from the Propose step.
A majority rule equilibrium (MRE), also known as the Condorcet winner, is a pro-
posal which would beat any other proposal, i.e. always receives a majority of the three
votes cast. Whenever this proposal is voted on, it will win. Therefore, it is a commonly
accepted solution concept for the decision resulting from a majority rule dynamic.
For this paper, we will consider only graphs for which every group of three partic-
ipants has a majority rule equilibrium. It turns out that this requirement coincides
exactly with a class of graphs known as median graphs [Bandelt and Chepoi 2008;
Knuth 2011] (see Theorem 6.2), which include common classes of graphs such as trees,
grids, and squaregraphs. Moreover, for median graphs, the majority rule equilibrium
of any three participants coincides with the generalized median.
THEOREM 6.2. Consider any unweighted and undirected graph G. Let P denote the
property in which every set of three nodes has a Majority Rule Equilibrium (Condorcet
winner). Then,
G satisfies P if and only if G is a median graph
Moreover, the Condorcet winner of any set of three nodes is the unique generalized me-
dian for that set.
PROOF. See Appendix E for the proof.
Thus, we let gt = g(St) = majority-rule-equilibrium(St) = generalized-median(St).
As is also mentioned in the proof of Theorem 7.3, for any one of the three individuals
(say, x), the generalized median is also the closest point to x that lies between y and z.
Because of this, it is reasonable to suppose that the small group of individuals can find
their equilibrium quickly.
6.2. Scalability theorem for triadic decision-making
We now show that a small number of triadic interactions can tightly approximate
the generalized median. We highlight the stark contrast between the approximation
achieved by triadic decision-making, for which the error
√
c log n/n tends to 0 as n
becomes large, and dyadic decision-making, for which the error is lower bounded by
1/8.
THEOREM 6.3. Consider a triadic decision-making process L = (V, f, g) where n
participants V form a median graph. Then, with probability at least 1− n log n
nc
, c ≥ 2,
T = O(cn log2 n) and D(x∗) ≤D(xˆ) ≤
(
1 +O
(√
c log n
n
))
D(x∗)
PROOF. A high-level understanding of our proof is that, for median graphs, the
given urn dynamic can be reduced to several (simpler) coupled urn dynamics, rep-
resented by edges in E∗. E∗ (defined in Appendix B) can be thought of roughly as
“independent dimensions” of a median graph. Most of the proof is then tying the ap-
proximation factor or time of the overall urn process to those of the simpler coupled
urn dynamics.
Our proof will be split into several lemmas. The lower bound D(xˆ) ≥ D(x∗) is trivial
by the definition of x∗ as the generalized median. To prove the upper bound, we first
rewrite D(x) as,
D(x) =
n∑
i=1
d(x, xi) =
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈E∗
1{e ∈ Ixxi} =
∑
e∈E∗
|{i | e ∈ Ixxi}|
where Ixy is the set of nodes lying on a shortest path between x and y (see Appendix
A). The second equality comes from a property of median graphs stating that d(x, y) =∑
e∈E∗ 1{e ∈ Ixy} (Lemma B.7 in the Appendix). From this, it follows that
D(xˆ)
D(x∗)
≤ max
e∈E∗
|{i | e ∈ Ixˆxi}|
|{i | e ∈ Ix∗xi}|
In Lemma F.1, we show that
Pr
[
|{i | e ∈ Ixˆxi}|
|{i | e ∈ Ix∗xi}|
>
(
1 +O
(√
c log n
n
))]
≤ 1
nc
,
We can now achieve our upper bound via a union bound on all edges of E∗, noting that
|E∗| ≤ |E| ≤ n log n (Lemma B.6).
To bound T , we first define Te=(u,v) as the first time t at which all tokens yti lie in
either Wuv or Wvu (informally, either closer to node u or node v, see Definition A.3). By
Lemma B.5, we have
T = max
e∈E∗
Te
We show in Lemma F.2 that Te = O(cn log2 n) with probability at least 1− 1nc . Then we
can achieve our result T = O(cn log2 n) via a union bound on all edges of E∗.
When one considers grid graphs and trees, one can derive remarkably strong results
using roughly the same proof techniques. Triadic decision-making is essentially able to
find the exact generalized median with high probability, a very surprising result given
the extreme randomness of the process.
THEOREM 6.4. Consider n = 9k2 participants which make up a k × k grid, so that
each point in the grid has 9 participants. Assume k is odd. Then with probability greater
than 99.4%, the winning participant xˆ is the exact generalized median x∗ (the middle
point of the grid) regardless of how large k is.
THEOREM 6.5. Consider n participants which make up a binary tree of height h.
Then with probability greater than 1 − 4e−n/16, the winning participant xˆ is either
the root node (the generalized median) or one of its two children. This is again true
regardless of how large k is.
Even stronger results hold for higher-dimensional grids or higher degree trees.
6.3. A simpler, restricted variant
The downside of the above setting is that participants will need to take time to discover
the opinions of other participants. An implementation of this in practice would require
more discovery mechanisms and tools. An accurate analysis would require a model of
this discovery process, which is out of the scope of this paper.
In this section, we consider a simpler setting in which the small group decision is
restricted to one of the members of the triad itself, i.e. gt ∈ St. It turns out that an
extremely simple process exists for finding the majority rule equilibrium under this
restriction: simply ask each participate to vote on one of the other two participants.
The participant who receives the largest number of votes wins. If there is a tie, then
there is no exchange in tokens. This dynamic was analyzed in [Goel and Lee 2012] and
shown to obtain essentially similar results for the case of opinions on a line. Here, we
extend these results to star nodes (Theorem 6.6) and also give simulations indicating
that it also works for trees and grids (Figure 5). Extending this to all median graphs
(and perhaps beyond) remains an interesting open problem.
THEOREM 6.6. Consider n participants on a star graph, for which j = Ω(
√
cn log n)
of the participants are located at the root, and for which the remaining n−j participants
are distributed evenly among the k leaves. Then with probability greater than 1 − n−c,
the winning participant xˆ is a participant at the root node.
(a) Tree of height 10 (b) 21x21 Grid (c) Grid with 5 initial tokens
Fig. 5: These plots show the number of wins for nodes over 1000 runs of restricted triadic
decision-making. We consider two graphs: (a) a binary tree of height 10, and (b, c) a grid of size
21x21. Each of these are simulated with two initial conditions: one or five initial tokens per
participant. With five initial tokens, the root node of the tree wins 63.9% of the time and the top
three nodes win 99.9% of the time. Similarly, with five initial tokens, the center node of the grid
wins 44.7% of the time and the middle 9 nodes win 99.6% of the time.
PROOF. We use {Rt, t ≥ 0}, Rt ∈ Zk+1, to denote a markov chain which is induced
by restricted triadic decision-making (RTD) on the star. At time t,
(1) Rt1 is the number of tokens at the center (root node) of the star,
(2) Rtj is the number of tokens at the j − 1-th leaf node of the star for j = 2, . . . , k + 1.
We use {R′t, t ≥ 0}, R′t ∈ Z2, to denote a truncated representation which encodes the
number of tokens at the center of the star and the max number of tokens at the leaf
nodes. Specifically,
R′t1 = Rt1, and R
′
t2 = max
2≤j≤k+1
Rtj
It is easy to verify that {Rt, t ≥ 0} is a markov chain because restricted triadic decision-
making only depends on the positions of the tokens.However, the truncated represen-
tation {R′t, t ≥ 0} is not a markov chain since transition probabilities depend on the
distribution of the tokens among the leaves.
A major step in our proof will be to couple {Rt, t ≥ 0} to another stochastic process
{St, t ≥ 0}, St ∈ Zk+1, which we will call the concentrated variant of restricted triadic
decision-making on the star (CRTD). The state space of St is the same as that of Rt
and also describes a partition of n tokens over the k + 1 nodes of the star graph. At
time t,
(1) St1 is the number of tokens at the center (root node) of the star,
(2) Stj is the number of tokens at the j − 1-th leaf node of the star for j = 2, . . . , k + 1.
A step of this markov chain involves first taking a step according to the normal RTD
transition resulting from a triad. Once this is done, the maximum number of tokens on
the leaf nodes is calculated and the tokens on the leaves are then concentrated while
preserving the calculated maximum and ensuring that St2 ≥ St3 ≥ . . . ≥ St(k+1). As a
simple example, suppose there are 5, 4, 3, and 2 tokens on leaf nodes St2, St3, St4, St5
respectively after a step of the RTD transition. Then the max number of tokens on the
leaf nodes is 5, and concentrating the tokens would result in 5, 5, 4, and 0 tokens on leaf
nodes St2, St3, St4, St5 respectively. We define a corresponding truncated representation
to be {S′t, t ≥ 0}, S′t ∈ Z2, where
S′t1 = St1, and S
′
t2 = max
2≤j≤k+1
Stj
It is easy to verify that both {St, t ≥ 0} and {S′t, t ≥ 0} are markov chains.With these
definitions, we can state the following three lemmas (proof in Appendix G):
(1) (Lemma G.1): Consider any two CRTD dynamics Xt, Yt, and their corresponding
truncated representations X ′t, Y ′t . Suppose that X ′j1 ≤ Y ′j1 and X ′j2 ≥ Y ′j2 for some
j. Then we show that a coupling exists such that X ′(j+1)1 ≤ Y ′(j+1)1 and X ′(j+1)2 ≥
Y ′(j+1)2.
(2) (Lemma G.2): Consider a CRTD dynamic Yt and a RTD dynamic Zt and their cor-
responding truncated representations Y ′t , Z ′t. Suppose that Y ′j1 = Z ′j1 and Y ′j2 = Z ′j2
for some j. Then we show that a coupling exists such that Y ′(j+1)1 ≤ Z ′(j+1)1 and
Y ′(j+1)2 ≥ Z ′(j+1)2.
(3) (Lemma G.3): Consider a CRTD dynamic Xt and a RTD dynamic Zt and their
corresponding truncated representationsX ′t, Z ′t. Suppose thatX ′01 ≤ Z ′01 andX ′02 ≥
Z ′02. Then we show that a coupling exists such that X ′t1 ≤ Z ′t1 and X ′t2 ≥ Z ′t2 for all
t and for every history of the markov chain.
We can now wrap up our proof. Consider a CRTD dynamic Xt and a RTD dynamic Zt
and their corresponding truncated representations X ′t, Z ′t. Suppose that X0 = (a, (n −
a)/2, (n − a)/2, 0, . . . , 0) and that X ′01 ≤ Z ′01 and X ′02 ≥ Z ′02. By Lemma G.3, a coupling
exists such that whenever the center of the star wins in Xt, i.e. X ′t converges to (n, 0),
the center of the star must also win in Zt, i.e. Z ′t has converged to (n, 0). Therefore the
probability that the center of the star wins in Zt is at least as high as the probability
that the center of the star wins in Xt.
We now calculate the probability that the center of the star wins in Xt. The main
observation is that, for our initial condition, the star being considered in Xt only has
two leaves. It is easy to verify that in this case, the CRTD dynamic is identical to the
RTD dynamic (the leaves are always already “concentrated”). Moreover, since a star
with two leaves is simply a line, we already have the probability that the center of the
star wins in Xt. For a = Ω(
√
cn log n), this probability is greater than 1 − n−c, which
concludes our proof.
7. TRIADIC DECISION-MAKING SUCCEEDS WITH STRATEGIC AGENTS
One cannot naively apply the prior results to strategic agents in a full LDSG process.
This is because a strategic agent wants to ultimately maximize the utility he receives
from the global decision xˆ. Thus, an agent might settle for a worse consensus decision
in a given small group if it could help in the long run. We show that this does not
happen and that, in fact, we can achieve the same results described in Theorem 6.3
for strategic agents under a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium [Shoham and Leyton-
Brown 2008].
7.1. Game theoretic formalization
The entire decision-making process induced by Definition 6.1 and the majority rule
process (Section 6.1) can be formalized as an infinite horizon extensive form game (see
Figures 4 and 6). A full strategy for the game involves choosing, given every possible
past history, a strategy for how one votes and proposes motions. For each individual
  
x
yy
zz zz
...
u
...
f
Small group selection
Propose
Vote
Fig. 6: The game-theoretic representation of triadic decision-making with majority rule is an
infinite horizon extensive form game made out of several blocks as depicted in Figure 4. The
“Small group selection” block is played by the small group selection function f who selects one
of n3 possible triads according to the probability distribution described by Definition 6.1. The
“Propose” block for a player u consists of n + 1 actions corresponding to either proposing to
replace the current winner with one of the n participants or motioning to end the process. The
“Vote” block for the small group x, y, z consists of a simultaneous vote to either accept or reject
the proposal. The fact that these votes are simultaneous is represented formally by making the
nodes for y and for z a single information set.
i, the utility assigned from the game is defined as ui(xˆ) = −d(xi, xˆ) if a winner xˆ is
produced, and −∞ if the game never terminates.1
7.2. Approximation and time results for strategic agents in the unrestricted setting
We show that a strategy which we call truthful bargaining achieves a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibria for the aforementioned game while also returning the generalized
median as the consensus decision of each small group. This means that the results of
Theorem 6.3 carry over to this equilibrium.
The truthful bargaining strategy is simple in that it is independent of past small
group interactions. Roughly speaking, it requires a participant to vote truthfully be-
tween opinions, and to propose his best “bargaining point” when one exists, and to
motion to end the process otherwise. When voting on a motion to end, truthful bar-
gaining requires a participant to accept the motion when he has no bargaining points,
and reject it otherwise.
Definition 7.1. Suppose that w is the current winner in a triadic majority rule pro-
cess between participants x, y, z. Define the bargaining points for participant x to be
any point which is not the current winner w, but lies on a shortest path between w and
x as well as a shortest path between w and at least one of y or z. The best bargaining
point for x is the bargaining point which is closest to himself.
Definition 7.2. Define truthful bargaining to be the strategy in which, independent
of the past history,
— If a vote is taken for a proposed alternative, the agent votes truthfully according to
his preference,
— If it is the agent’s turn to propose a motion, he proposes his best bargaining points
if one exists, and motions to end otherwise,
— If a vote is taken on a motion to end, he accepts if he has no bargaining points, and
rejects it otherwise.
For all of these decisions, ties are broken arbitrarily.
1We use this definition of utility due to its simplicity and space constraints; however, our results hold for a
much broader class of utilities known as single-peaked preferences.
THEOREM 7.3. Consider a triadic decision-making process L = (V, f, g) where par-
ticipants V form a median graph and gt is determined by a majority rule process be-
tween the participants St. Then the truthful bargaining strategy is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, gt = generalized-median(St) for all t.
PROOF. We prove this through several lemmas. We first show that, if all partici-
pants follow truthful bargaining, then the consensus decision of each triad S will be
the generalized median of S (Lemma I.1). Following this, we consider any triadic round
of any subgame in which one participant u deviates. We show that regardless of the
strategy that u deviates to, either the round never ends or the generalized median of
S lies on a shortest path from u to the resulting winner w′ (Lemma I.8). Finally, we
leverage Lemma I.8 to showing that, for any subgame, if one participant u deviates,
then the utility received is stochastically dominated by the utility received if u did not
deviate (Lemma I.9), which concludes our proof.
Since we have shown that gt = generalized-median(St), the approximation and time
bounds of Theorem 6.3 extend to the strategic case.
8. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
In this paper, we proposed a model in which sequences of small group interactions are
used to scale up decision-making. We showed that small groups can find the wisdom
of the crowd efficiently — sometimes in situations when the group at large is unable
to come to a stable decision — but we also showed that the feasibility of doing so can
depend strongly on the size of the small groups. This phenomenon, which also applies
to simple opinion formation dynamics, is succinctly summarized by the following apho-
rism: while two heads are better than one, three heads are better than two.
There are many questions remaining that we view as promising directions for future
research. In our paper, we studied a particular approach and dynamic to scaling delib-
erative decision-making. We believe that the problem of scaling deliberative decision-
making deserves a broader and more fundamental framework. Perhaps one can define
a model for deliberative social choice, in which a global choice is calculated from a sub-
set of small group choices. This should be done first for participants whose opinions
do not change (like in this paper and in majority rule dynamics), but then should be
extended to true deliberative models which account for transfer of information and
evolution of opinions. Such mathematical work should also be coupled to systems work
which consider motivational challenges and interaction interfaces. Ultimately, all of
these should work towards a realization of deliberative democracy in practice.
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APPENDIX
A. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
Definition A.1. Define the interval Ixy between points x and y to be the set con-
taining all points lying on a shortest path between x and y, i.e. Ixy = {w | d(x, y) =
d(x,w) + d(w, y)}. For an edge e = (i, j) we let e ∈ Ixy if i, j ∈ Ixy.
Definition A.2. Define a set S to be convex if for any two points x, y in S, every
shortest path between x and y also lies in S, i.e. x, y ∈ S =⇒ Ixy ∈ S. Define the
convex hull of a set S to be the smallest convex set that contains S.
Definition A.3. For any edge e = (u, v), define the win setsWuv = {w ∈ V | d(w, u) <
d(w, v)} and Wvu = {w ∈ V | d(w, v) < d(w, u)} to be the set of nodes that are closer to
u or v respectively.
Definition A.4. We will use the notationm(x, y, z) to denote the generalized median
of the points x, y, z, i.e. m(x, y, z) = arg minu∈V d(u, x) + d(u, y) + d(u, z).
Definition A.5. A node x ∈ V is a Condorcet winner for the set S if, for any other
node y ∈ V , |{u ∈ S | d(u, x) < d(u, y)}| > |{u ∈ S | d(u, y) < d(u, x)}|.
Definition A.6. A graph is a median graph if, for every x, y, z, there is exactly one
point which simultaneously lies on some shortest path between x and y, between x and
z, and between y and z, i.e. |Ixy ∩ Ixz ∩ Iyz| = 1.
B. PROPERTIES OF MEDIAN GRAPHS
Median graphs are well-studied and have a rich structure. We list several properties
that we use, which can be found in the following references [Bandelt and Chepoi 2008;
Imrich and Klavz˘ar 2000; Klavzˇar and Mulder 1999; Knuth 2011; Mulder 1978].
LEMMA B.1. Any convex set S in a median graph V is gated. That is, for any x in
the graph V , there exists some gate g(x) ∈ S such that for any node y ∈ S, some shortest
path from x to y goes through g(x).
LEMMA B.2. The interval Ixy between any two nodes x and y in a median graph is
convex.
LEMMA B.3. For any a, b, c, d, e ∈ V where V is a median graph, m(a, b,m(c, d, e)) =
m(m(a, b, c),m(a, b, d), e).
LEMMA B.4. For any edge e = (u, v) in a median graph V , Wuv and Wvu are convex
sets that partition the nodes.
LEMMA B.5. For any two unique nodes, there exists at least one edge that partitions
them.
LEMMA B.6. For a median graph with n nodes, there are at most n2 log n edges in
the graph.
LEMMA B.7. Let E∗ denote a minimal set of edges such that the win sets of E∗
partition all the nodes of the graph. Then the distance between two nodes x and y is
equal to the number of edges in E∗ that separate x and y.
LEMMA B.8. x ∈ Iyz ⇐⇒ x ∈Wuv if y, z ∈Wuv for all e = (u, v).
C. KNOWN RANDOM WALK LEMMA
We use a lemma which is found in [Goel and Lee 2012], which discusses how to scale
up voting also using the theme of triads.
LEMMA C.1. Consider an absorbing random walk Xt on the integers 0, 1, . . . , n with
the following transition probabilities:
Pr[Xt+1 = Xt + ∆] =

3X2t (n−Xt)
n3 if ∆ = 1
3Xt(n−Xt)2
n3 if ∆ = −1
X3t+(n−Xt)3
n3 if ∆ = 0
Let T denote the absorption time at which the random walk first hits state 0 or n. Then,
Pr[XT = n] =
(
1
2
)n−1 n∑
j=1
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
E[T ] ≤ n lnn+O(n)
D. PROOF OF THEOREM 6.3
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3. Consider the line graph, represented on the reals R, for
which n = 2k + 1 and xi = i for i = 1, 2, . . . , k and xi = 0 otherwise. For any group of
two participants S = {x, y}, the convex hull of the participants is simply the interval
between them. Clearly, S has the same relationship structure as itself under ψ(t) =
x+ y − t, i.e. the interval x, x+ 1, . . . , y is isomorphic to itself when reversed. Invoking
local consistency implies that g(S) ∈ {x, x+1, . . . , y} and g(S) = ψ(g(S)), implying that
g must be symmetric about the point 12 (x + y). Define Yt =
1
n
∑
i y
t
i and consider time
t+ 1 for which St+1 = {j1, j2}. Then,
nE[Yt+1 | yt] =
∑
i
E[yt+1i | yt]
=
 ∑
i 6∈St+1
yti
+ E[yt+1j1 + yt+1j2 | yt]
=
 ∑
i 6∈St+1
yti
+ E[2 · 1
2
(ytj1 + y
t
j2) | yt] = nYt
Therefore, Yt is a martingale, and for any time t, E[Yt] = Y0. Noting that D(·) is convex,
we can apply Jensen’s inequality to get E
[
1
n
∑
iD(y
t
i)
] ≥ D (E [ 1n∑i yti]) = D(Y0). It
is not hard to verify that D(Y0) = ( 98 − o(1))D(x∗) for the line graph given, which
concludes our proof.
E. PROOF OF THEOREM 7.2
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2. We will break this proof up into several lemmas. Con-
sider a set S = {x, y, z} and a node c. We will refer to the following possible statements
for any node v
(1) v is a Condorcet winner for S,
(2) v lies on a shortest path between x and y, x and z, and y and z,
(3) v is a generalized median for S.
We first show that if c satisfies 1, then c satisfies 2 (Lemma E.1) and is the unique
node satisfying 3 (Lemma E.2). But since any node satisfying 2 must satisfy 3 (Lemma
E.4), then c must be the unique node satisfying 2. Therefore, G satisfies P only if G is
a median graph (see Definition A.6).
We then show that if c is the unique node satisfying 2, then c satisfies 1 (Lemma
E.5). Therefore G satisfies P if G is a median graph (see Definition A.6).
LEMMA E.1. Consider any three nodes x, y, z of an unweighted and undirected
graph. Suppose that there exists a node c which is a Condorcet winner for x, y, z. Then
c lies on a shortest path between x and y, x and z, and y and z.
PROOF. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that c does not lie on a shortest path
between x and y, so that
d(x, c) + d(c, y) > d(x, y) (1)
Since c is a Condorcet winner, it must beat y in a pairwise election. But since y would
clearly vote for itself over c, both x and z must vote for c. This implies that
d(x, y) > d(x, c) (2)
Now, since the graph is unweighted, there lies a point p ∈ Ixy such that
d(x, c) = d(x, p) (3)
Applying equations (1, 2, 3) gives us d(y, p) = d(x, y)−d(x, p) = d(x, y)−d(x, c) < d(y, c).
Then we have a point p such that x is ambivalent between p and c, and y prefers p. Then
c cannot be a Condorcet winner, and we have a contradiction. Therefore c must lie on
a shortest path between x and y. The same argument shows that c must also lie on a
shortest path between x and z, and y and z.
LEMMA E.2. Consider any three nodes x, y, z of an unweighted and undirected
graph. Suppose that there exists a node c which is a Condorcet winner for x, y, z. Then
c is the unique generalized median for x, y, z.
PROOF. Suppose for the sake of contradiction, that another node m is a generalized
median. Since c is a Condorcet winner, we can split the proof into the following two
cases.
Case 1: None of x, y, z prefer m to c, and at least one prefers c to m. In this case, it is
trivially true that d(x, c) + d(y, c) + d(z, c) < d(x,m) + d(y,m) + d(z,m), so m cannot be
a generalized median.
Case 2: Two of x, y, z (x, y without loss of generality) prefer c to m and z prefers m to
c. Since the graph is unweighted, there lies a point p ∈ Ixm such that
d(x, p) = d(x, c) (4)
But then, we must have d(y, p) ≥ d(y,m) (Lemma E.3). Since y prefers c to m, this
implies that
d(y, p) > d(y, c) (5)
Since c is a Condorcet winner, then equations (4, 5) imply
d(z, p) ≥ d(z, c) (6)
Applying (6), the triangle inequality, the fact that p ∈ Ixm, and (4) results in d(z, c) ≤
d(z, p) ≤ d(z,m)+d(m, p) = d(z,m)+d(m,x)−d(p, x) = d(z,m)+d(m,x)−d(x, c). Adding
d(x, c) on both sides tells us that
d(z, c) + d(x, c) ≤ d(z,m) + d(x,m) (7)
Repeating the same argument with p ∈ Iym gives us
d(z, c) + d(y, c) ≤ d(z,m) + d(y,m) (8)
But we also know that
d(x, c) + d(y, c) < d(x,m) + d(y,m) (9)
since x and y prefer c tom. Adding equations (7, 8, 9) together, we get 2(d(x, c)+d(y, c)+
d(z, c)) < 2(d(x,m)+d(y,m)+d(z,m)), which means that m is not a generalized median
and we have a contradiction. Therefore, c must be the unique generalized median.
LEMMA E.3. Consider any three nodes x, y, z of an unweighted and undirected
graph and a node m which is a generalized median for x, y, z. Then for any point
p ∈ Ixm, d(y, p) ≥ d(y,m).
PROOF. We have
d(x,m) + d(y,m) + d(z,m)
≤ d(x, p) + d(y, p) + d(z, p) (10)
≤ d(x, p) + d(y, p) + d(p,m) + d(z,m) (11)
= d(x,m) + d(y, p) + d(z,m) (12)
where (10) follows from m being the generalized median, (11) follows from the triangle
inequality, and (12) follows from p ∈ Ixm. Subtracting d(x,m) + d(z,m) on both sides
gives us d(y, p) ≥ d(y,m).
LEMMA E.4. Consider any three nodes x, y, z of an unweighted and undirected
graph. Suppose that there exists a node m which lies on a shortest path between x
and y, x and z, and y and z. Then m is a generalized median for x, y, z.
PROOF. Consider any other point m′. Then,
2(d(x,m) + d(y,m) + d(z,m))
= d(x, y) + d(x, z) + d(y, z) (13)
≤ 2(d(x,m′) + d(y,m′) + d(z,m′)) (14)
where (13) follows from the fact that m lies on the shortest path between every two of
x, y, z and (14) follows from the triangle inequality.
LEMMA E.5. Consider any three nodes x, y, z of an unweighted and undirected
graph. Suppose that there exists a unique node m which lies on a shortest path between
x and y, x and z, and y and z. Then m is a Condorcet winner for x, y, z.
PROOF. Consider any other node m′. Then there must be one pair (x and y without
loss of generality) such thatm′ does not lie on a shortest path between them. Therefore,
d(x,m) + d(m, y) < d(x,m′) + d(m′, y), which implies that at least one of d(x,m) <
d(x,m′) or d(y,m) < d(y,m′) is true. Let this node be x without loss of generality. If
neither of y or z is closer to m′ than m, then m beats m′ in a pairwise election and we
are done.
Now suppose one of y or z is closer to m′ than m. Then it must be true that the other
is closer to m than m′ since d(y,m) + d(m, z) ≤ d(y,m′) + d(m′, z). Therefore, m still
beats m′ in a pairwise election. Since this holds for any m′, this means that m is the
Condorcet winner.
F. LEMMAS FOR THEOREM 7.3
LEMMA F.1. Consider a triadic decision-making process L = (V, f, g) where partic-
ipants V form a median graph and gt = g(St) = generalized-median(St). Fix an edge
e = (u, v). Then,
Pr
[
|{i | e ∈ Ixˆxi}|
|{i | e ∈ Ix∗xi}|
>
(
1 +O
(√
c log n
n
))]
≤ 1
nc
PROOF. Without loss of generality, suppose that Wuv contains less of the n partici-
pants and that Wvu contains more. Let N1 denote the number of participants in Wvu
and N2 denote the number of participants in Wuv, so that N2 ≤ N1 and N1 + N2 = n
(Lemma B.4).
We first note that |{i | e ∈ Ixˆxi}| is simply the number of xi which are in a different
partition Wuv, Wvu than xˆ (Lemma B.8). This must be either N1 or N2 depending on
whether xˆ ∈Wuv or xˆ ∈Wvu, so
|{i | e ∈ Ixˆxi}|
|{i | e ∈ Ix∗xi}|
> 1 ⇐⇒ |{i | e ∈ Ixˆxi}| = N1 and
|{i | e ∈ Ix∗xi}| = N2
Let us first consider the case when N2 ≤ n2 −
√
cn lnn. Then we show that Pr[xˆ ∈
Wuv] ≤ n−c (Lemma F.2) which implies that |{i|e∈Ixˆxi}||{i|e∈Ix∗xi}| > 1 with probability at most
n−c.
Let us now consider the case when N2 ≥ n2 −
√
cn lnn. Then,
|{i | e ∈ Ixˆxi}|
|{i | e ∈ Ix∗xi}|
≤ N1
N2
=
n−N2
N2
=
(
1 +O
(√
c log n
n
))
and our theorem statement is trivially true.
LEMMA F.2. Consider a triadic decision-making process L = (V, f, g) where partic-
ipants V form a median graph and gt = g(St) = generalized-median(St). Fix an edge
e = (u, v) and suppose that less than n2 −
√
cn lnn participants belong to the win set Wuv.
Also, let Te denote the first time t at which all tokens yti belong to either Wuv or Wvu.
Then,
Pr[xˆ ∈Wuv] ≤ n−c (15)
Pr[Te > cn ln2 n] < O(n−c) (16)
PROOF. Let Xt = |{i | yti ∈ Wuv} denote the number of tokens in Wuv at time t. By
Lemma F.3, the generalized median of three nodes will belong to Wuv if and only if at
least two of the three nodes belong to Wuv. Therefore,
Pr[Xt+1 = Xt + ∆] =

3X2t (n−Xt)
n3 if ∆ = 1
3Xt(n−Xt)2
n3 if ∆ = −1
X3t+(n−Xt)3
n3 if ∆ = 0
To prove Equation 15, we note that the event xˆ ∈ Wuv corresponds to the event that
XTe = n. Applying Lemma C.1, we have
Pr[xˆ ∈Wuv] ≤
(
1
2
)n−1 n2−√cn lnn∑
j=1
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
≤ exp
−1
2
· n
2
·
(√
cn lnn
n/2
)2 = 1
nc
where the second inequality is found by interpreting the binomial expression in terms
of coin flips and applying Chernoff ’s bound.
Equation 16 follows by applying techniques for high-probability bounds for proba-
bilistic recurrences (we follow the technique of [Aspnes 2013]):
Let T (i) denote Te given X0 = i. Then T (i) satisfies the probabilistic recurrence
T (i) = piT (i+ 1) + qiT (i− 1) + riT (i) + 1
where pi, qi, ri are the probabilities of the transitions i→ i+1, i→ i−1 and i→ i. From
Lemma C.1, we have that E[T (i)] ≤ T ∗ for all i, and for T ∗ = n lnn+O(n). By Markov’s
inequality, Pr[T (i) ≥ αT ∗] ≤ 1α , for any α > 0. By conditional probability, Pr[T (i) ≥
2αT ∗] = Pr[T (i) ≥ 2αT ∗ | T (i) ≥ αT ∗]Pr[T (i) ≥ αT ∗]. But note that Pr[T (i) ≥ 2αT ∗ |
T (i) ≥ αT ∗] ≤ 1α since the remaining random walk conditioned at the point when
T (i) = αT ∗ is just distributed as T (i′) for some i′. Repeating this logic gives Pr[T (i) ≥
kαT ∗] ≤ αk. Choosing α = e and k = c lnn gives us our desired result. Note that the
point at which T (i) = αT ∗ exists for any T ∗ chosen such that αT ∗ is an integer since
T (i) increases in integer increments.
LEMMA F.3. Consider any edge e = (u, v) of a median graph V and three nodes
S = {x, y, z}. Let W ∗ denote the set Wuv or Wvu which contains at least two of the three
nodes. Then generalized-median(S) ∈W ∗.
PROOF. First we note that Wuv and Wvu partition V (Lemma B.4). Therefore, by
pigeonhole principle, at least two of x, y, z belong to the same set, so that W ∗ is well
defined. Suppose, without loss of generality, that x, y ∈W ∗. We know thatW ∗ is convex
(Lemma B.4). Therefore, Ixy ⊆W ∗ (Definition A.2). But then m(x, y, z) ∈ Ixy ⊆W ∗.
G. LEMMAS FOR THEOREM 7.6
LEMMA G.1. Consider any two CRTD dynamics Xt, Yt, and their corresponding
truncated representations X ′t, Y ′t . Suppose that X ′j1 ≤ Y ′j1 and X ′j2 ≥ Y ′j2 for some j.
Then a coupling exists such that X ′(j+1)1 ≤ Y ′(j+1)1 and X ′(j+1)2 ≥ Y ′(j+1)2.
PROOF. The proof for this is just a lot of algebra, so we will not go through it here.
Since X ′t, Y ′t are markov chains, we can simply write out the expressions for all the
state transitions and their probabilities. Once we do so, breaking it up into multiple
cases will enable one to verify that a coupling of these different cases satisfies the
desired property (that X ′(j+1)1 ≤ Y ′(j+1)1 and X ′(j+1)2 ≥ Y ′(j+1)2).
LEMMA G.2. Consider a CRTD dynamic Yt, a RTD dynamic Zt, and their corre-
sponding truncated representations Y ′t , Z ′t. Suppose that Y ′j1 = Z ′j1 and Y ′j2 = Z ′j2 for
some j. Then a coupling exists such that Y ′(j+1)1 ≤ Z ′(j+1)1 and Y ′(j+1)2 ≥ Z ′(j+1)2.
PROOF. The proof for this is almost identical for the prior case. The only difference
is that Z ′t is not a markov chain. In order to compare to Y ′t , simply use Zt and write
expressions for the probabilities that we get transitions in Z ′t (in terms of Zt). We will
be able to bound certain expressions through the following optimization problem
maximize
z2,...,zk+1
∑
2≤j≤k+1
(zj
n
)2
subject to
∑
2≤j≤k+1
zj =
∑
2≤j≤k+1
Ztj ,
0 ≤ zj ≤ Z ′t2, j = 2, . . . , k + 1,
z2 ≥ z3 ≥ · · · ≥ zk+1.
which is solved at
zj =

Z ′t2 for j ≤ b
∑k+1
i=2 Zti/Z
′
t2c∑k+1
i=2 Zti/Z
′
t2 mod Z
′
t2 for j = b
∑k+1
i=2 Zti/Z
′
t2c+ 1
0 otherwise
Once this is done, breaking it up into multiple cases will enable one to verify that a
coupling of these different cases satisfies the desired property (that Y ′(j+1)1 ≤ Z ′(j+1)1
and Y ′(j+1)2 ≥ Z ′(j+1)2).
LEMMA G.3. Consider a CRTD dynamic Xt, a RTD dynamic Zt, and their corre-
sponding truncated representations X ′t, Z ′t. Suppose that X ′01 ≤ Z ′01 and X ′02 ≥ Z ′02.
Then a coupling exists such that X ′t1 ≤ Z ′t1 and X ′t2 ≥ Z ′t2 for all t and for every history
of the markov chain.
PROOF. Consider some time j such that X ′j1 ≤ Z ′j1 and X ′j2 ≥ Z ′j2. Define a CRTD
dynamic Yt and its corresponding truncated representation Y ′t . Let Yj = Zj so that
Y ′j1 = Z
′
j1 and Y ′j2 = Z ′j2. We then have X ′j1 ≤ Y ′j1 = Z ′j1 and X ′j2 ≥ Y ′j2 = Z ′j2.
By Lemmas G.1 and G.2, it is possible to define a coupling such that X ′(j+1)1 ≤
Y ′(j+1)1 ≤ Z ′(j+1)1 and X ′(j+1)2 ≥ Y ′(j+1)2 ≥ Z ′(j+1)2. Therefore, we have proven the
inductive hypothesis that X ′j1 ≤ Z ′j1 and X ′j2 ≥ Z ′j2 =⇒ X ′(j+1)1 ≤ Z ′(j+1)1 and
X ′(j+1)2 ≥ Z ′(j+1)2. Since we have the condition satisfied for j = 0 based on the ini-
tial condition, we can simply use the inductive step to conclude our result for all t.
H. FORMAL STRATEGIC DEFINITIONS
Definition H.1. A triadic majority rule (TMR) process is the tuple M = (V, S, a, v),
where V is the set of all participants, S = {x, y, z} ⊆ V is the set of three participants
in the small group, {at, t ≥ 1} is the proposal made during step t, which can either be
one of the participants in V or ∅ for a motion to end, and {vt(u), t ≥ 1, u ∈ S} denotes
the vote cast by participant u during step t, which can either be 1 or 0 for accepting or
rejecting the proposal respectively. Let wt denote the winner at the beginning of step
t, pt denote the participant proposing during step t, v∗t denote the majority vote in step
t, T denote the step at which the round ends, and wˆ denote the winner of the majority
rule process. Then,
w1 = x
p1 = y
v∗t = majority(vt(x), vt(y), vt(z))
wt+1 =
{
at if at 6= ∅ and v∗t = 1
wt otherwise
pt+1 =
{
u if vt(u) 6= v∗t
pt otherwise
T = min{t | at = ∅ and v∗t = 1}
wˆ = wT
Definition H.2. During step t of a TMR process, define the “preferred points” for
a participant u to be the set P tu of points which are on a shortest path from u to the
current winner wt, but not equal to wt, i.e. P tu = Iuwt \ {wt}.
Definition H.3. During step t of a TMR process, define the “bargaining points” for
the participant u to be the set Btu of points which are preferred points for both u and
at least one of the other participants u′ or u′′, i.e. Btu = (P tu ∩ P tu′) ∪ (P tu ∩ P tu′′).
Definition H.4. During step t of a TMR process, define the “best bargaining
point” b∗tu for the participant u to be the closest bargaining point to u, i.e. b∗tu =
arg minb∈Btu d(b, u).
Definition H.5. Define truthful bargaining to be the strategy in which agent x pro-
poses and votes in the following way:
at =
{
b∗tx if Btx 6= ∅
∅ otherwise
vt(x) =

1 if at = ∅ and Btx = ∅
1 if at 6= ∅ and d(x, at) < d(x,wt)
0 otherwise
I. LEMMAS FOR THEOREM 8.3
LEMMA I.1. Consider a round of TMR in which the three participants x, y, z follow
truthful bargaining. Then the winner of the round wˆ will be the generalized median of
x, y, z.
PROOF. As defined in Definition H.1, w1 = x, p1 = y. Since y is following truthful
bargaining, he proposes his best bargaining point, which is the closer of m(y, x, w1) and
m(y, z, w1) (Lemma I.2). Then since m(y, x, w1) = m(y, x, x) = x, and since m(y, z, w1) =
m(y, z, x) lies on a shortest path from y to x (Theorem 6.2), we have a1 = m(x, y, z).
We now have the votes v1(x) = 0, v1(z) = 1 since x clearly prefers himself to any
other point, and z prefers m(x, y, z) since m(x, y, z) must lie on a shortest path from z
to w1 = x (Theorem 6.2). This implies v∗1 = 1. Therefore,
w2 = m(x, y, z), p2 = x
It can be shown that none of the participants have any bargaining points at this step
(Lemma I.6), and thus, x motions to end, and all participants vote to accept, i.e.
a2 = ∅, v2(y) = 1, v2(z) = 1
Therefore, T = 2 and wˆ = wT = m(x, y, z).
LEMMA I.2. At step t of a TMR round, the best bargaining point of y, if it exists, is
the closer of m(y, x, wt) and m(y, z, wt).
PROOF. We know that Bty = (Iwtm(wt,y,x) ∪ Iwtm(wt,y,z)) \ {wt} (Lemma I.3). But
we also know that for any u ∈ Iwtm(wt,y,x), m(wt, y, x) ∈ Iyu (Lemma I.5). Therefore,
m(wt, y, x) is the closest of all points in Iwtm(wt,y,x) to y. One can argue similarly that
m(wt, y, z) is the closest of all points in Iwtm(wt,y,z) to y, and our result follows.
LEMMA I.3. At step t of a TMR round, the bargaining points for y are exactly
those points which lie on a shortest path from m(wt, y, x) to wt or a shortest path from
m(wt, y, z) to wt, but not including wt, i.e. Bty = (Iwtm(wt,y,x) ∪ Iwtm(wt,y,z)) \ {wt}.
PROOF. By Definitions H.2 and H.3,Bty = (P ty∩P tx)∪(P ty∩P tz) = ((Iywt∩Ixwt)∪(Iywt∩
Izwt)) \ {wt}. Then our result follows from Lemma I.4 since Iwtm(wt,y,x) = Ixwt ∩ Iywt
and Iwtm(wt,y,z) = Iywt ∩ Izwt .
LEMMA I.4. For nodes x, y, z in a median graph, Ixy ∩ Ixz = Ixm(x,y,z).
PROOF. First, consider any u ∈ Ixm(x,y,z). Then we can apply Lemma I.5 to get
u ∈ Ixy and u ∈ Ixz. Now consider any v ∈ Ixy ∩ Ixz. Then we know that m(v, x, y) =
m(v, x, z) = v and applying Lemma B.3, gets
m(v, x,m(x, y, z)) = m(m(v, x, y),m(v, x, z), x)
= m(v, v, x) = v
Therefore, v ∈ Ixm(x,y,z) and we get our result.
LEMMA I.5. Consider x, y, z ∈ V , where V is a median graph. Suppose for w ∈ V ,
w is on a shortest path from y to m(x, y, z). Then, m(x, y, z) must be on a shortest path
from x to w and w must be on a shortest path from x to y.
PROOF. By triangle inequality, d(x,w) ≤ d(x,m(x, y, z)) + d(m(x, y, z), w). But we
also have
d(x,w) ≥ d(x, y)− d(y, w) (17)
= d(x,m(x, y, z)) + d(m(x, y, z), y)− d(y, w) (18)
= d(x,m(x, y, z)) + d(w,m(x, y, z)) (19)
where (17) follows from the triangle inequality, (18) from m(x, y, z) ∈ Ixy (Theorem
6.2), and (19) from w ∈ Iym(x,y,z) (lemma statement). Therefore, we must have equality
which means m(x, y, z) ∈ Ixw. A similar argument shows us that w ∈ Ixy.
LEMMA I.6. Suppose that, at step t of a TMR round, wt = m(x, y, z). Then no par-
ticipants have any bargaining points.
PROOF. This follows directly from Lemma I.7.
LEMMA I.7. Participant y does not have any bargaining points at step t of a TMR
round if and only if wt ∈ Iym(x,y,z).
PROOF.
Bty = ∅ ⇐⇒ (Iwtm(wt,y,x) ∪ Iwtm(wt,y,z)) = {wt} (20)
⇐⇒ m(wt, y, x) = m(wt, y, z) = wt
⇐⇒ wt ∈ Iyx and wt ∈ Iyz
⇐⇒ wt ∈ Iym(x,y,z) (21)
where (20) is from Lemma I.3 and (21) is from Lemma I.4.
LEMMA I.8. Consider any subgame of a triadic decision-making process L =
(V, f, g) where participants V form a median graph and gt is determined by a ma-
jority rule process between the participants St. Consider any round s of TMR within
the subgame, including the round in which the initial node lies, and suppose that all
participants follow the truthful bargaining strategy except for one deviating participant
x ∈ Ss. Then either the round of TMR never ends or the generalized median of Ss lies
on a shortest path between x and the winner of the s-round wˆ = gs.
PROOF. Let Ss = {x, y, z}. We know that the initial node of a subgame cannot be in
the middle of a vote since all participants vote simultaneously (as captured formally
by the information sets). Suppose that the TMR round eventually ends. Then we know
that two of the three participants must have accepted a motion to end (Definition H.1).
This implies that one of y, z must have accepted a motion to end. Since they are both
following truthful bargaining, this means that at least one of them, y without loss of
generality, has no bargaining points (Definition H.5). But the only way for y not to
have any bargaining points is if wˆ is on a shortest path from y to m(x, y, z) (Lemma
I.7). But from here, it follows easily that m(x, y, z) must be on a shortest path from x
to wˆ (Lemma I.5).
LEMMA I.9. Consider any subgame of a triadic decision-making process L =
(V, f, g) where participants V form a median graph and gt is determined by a majority
rule process between the participants St. Suppose that all participants follow the truth-
ful bargaining strategy except for one deviating participant x. Then the utility received
by x is stochastically dominated by the utility received if x did not deviate.
PROOF. Fix any subgame. Let s denote the current TMR round that this subgame
is a part of. Recall that yti denotes the participant holding the i-th token after the t-th
round. Since x does not follow the truthful bargaining strategy, we will refer to the
resulting sequence of yti as the “deviating process”.
Now consider another instance of the same subgame in which all participants includ-
ing x follow the truthful bargaining strategy. Let yˆti denote the participant holding the
i-th token after the t-th round in this instance. We will refer to the resulting sequence
of yˆti as the “truthful process”.
Since both instances start at the same subgame, the tokens are distributed iden-
tically, and we can choose the indices such that yˆsi = ysi for all i. Now consider the
evolution of these two processes but, crucially, couple them so that the tokens chosen
in each round It are identical in both processes. In other words, if yti , ytj , ytk are chosen
for the t+ 1-th round in the deviating process, then yˆti , yˆtj , yˆtk are chosen for the t+ 1-th
round in the truthful process.
Clearly, at round s, yˆsi ∈ Ixysi for all i since yˆsi = ysi . We then give an inductive
argument: if yˆti ∈ Ixyti for all i, then either yˆt+1i ∈ Ixyt+1i for all i or the deviating process
never ends (Lemma I.10). Therefore, either the deviating process never ends or, for
each i and t ≥ s, yˆti is always on a shortest path from x to yti . Clearly, if the deviating
process never ends, the utility received by x in the truthful process is greater. If the
deviating process does end, then yˆTi is on a shortest path from x to yTi and therefore,
ux(yˆ
T
i ) ≥ ux(yTi ) for all i. It follows trivially that the utility received by x in the truthful
process stochastically dominates the utility received by x in the deviating process.
LEMMA I.10. Consider the truthful and deviating processes described in the proof
of Lemma I.9. Let yˆti and yti denote the tokens of the truthful and deviating processes
respectively. Suppose that after the t-th round, yˆti ∈ Ixyti for all i. Then after the t+ 1-th
round, either yˆt+1i ∈ Ixyt+1i for all i or the deviating process never ends.
PROOF. Let Sˆt and St denote the small groups of the truthful and deviating pro-
cesses respectively. Let It+1 = {i, j, k}, so that Sˆt+1 = {yˆti , yˆtj , yˆtk} and St+1 = {yti , ytj , ytk}.
We will consider three separate cases.
Case 1: x is represented twice in St+1. By our assumption that yˆti ∈ Ixyti , it must be
true that x is also represented twice in Sˆt+1. Then g(Sˆt+1) = x, so we have our result
trivially regardless of what g(St+1) is.
Case 2: x is not represented in St+1. Since x is not represented in St+1, then all agents
yti , y
t
j , y
t
k follow truthful bargaining. By the lemma assumption, all agents yˆ
t
i , yˆ
t
j , yˆ
t
k fol-
low truthful bargaining. Therefore, g(St+1) = generalized-median(St+1) (Lemma I.1)
and g(Sˆt+1) = generalized-median(Sˆt+1) (Lemma I.1). Then our result follows from
Lemma I.11.
Case 3: x is represented once in St+1. Let m denote g(St+1) if x follows truthful bar-
gaining. Then if x deviates, either the process never ends, or the winner m′ = g(St+1)
satisfies m ∈ Ixm′ (Lemma I.8). By the lemma assumption, all agents yˆti , yˆtj , yˆtk follow
truthful bargaining, so that g(Sˆt+1) = generalized-median(Sˆt+1). Then g(Sˆt+1) ∈ Ixm
(Lemma I.11). Therefore, either the deviating process never ends or g(Sˆt+1) ∈ Ixm′ .
LEMMA I.11. Consider x, y, z, x′, y′, z′, u ∈ V , where V is a median graph and sup-
pose that x ∈ Iux′ , y ∈ Iuy′ , z ∈ Iuz′ . Then, m(x, y, z) ∈ Ium(x′,y′,z′).
PROOF. Fix any edge e ∈ V and consider the partitions induced by its win sets (see
Lemma B.4). By Lemma F.3, we know that m(x′, y′, z′) is in the same win set as u if and
only if at least two of x′, y′, z′ are in the same win set as u. By Lemma B.8, we know
that this must imply that at least two of x, y, z are in the same win set as u, which
means that m(x, y, z) must also be in the same win set as u (Lemma F.3). Therefore,
for every edge, whenever m(x′, y′, z′) is in the same win set as u, m(x, y, z) is also in the
same win set. By Lemma B.8, this implies that m(x, y, z) lies on a shortest path from
u to m(x′, y′, z′), which concludes our proof.
